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NEW LAND FOR PEACE:  AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS 
 
John E. Noyes, Professor of Law, California Western School of Law*
  
 
A New Land for Peace project will require creative input from numerous disciplines. International law is 
one of those disciplines. But just what can international law and international lawyers contribute? The 
first section of this essay reflects broadly on the potential roles of international lawyers and the discipline 
of international law with respect to this project. 
 
The subsequent sections of this essay introduce some of the particular legal issues that would arise in 
planning for an artificial island component of a New Land for Peace project. Section II highlights a few 
substantive legal issues, concerning especially the law of the sea and international environmental law.  
Section III looks to past examples concerning the governance of territory to suggest some different ways 
that an entity that builds or operates an artificial island or economic development zone could be 
structured. Finally, Section IV highlights some of the procedural contexts in which various international 
law issues may be raised. 
 
I.  Roles of International Law and International Lawyers 
Law offers a formal check on the exercise of real power. Legal rules and institutions provide a touchstone 
of legitimacy for the exercise of power, by stating limits on the exercise of power and by allocating roles 
to various actors.1 Informal, social norms of course shape actions, but law and legal institutions can 
provide a particularly useful form of external authority to help allocate roles and transcend power-based 
decisions.2 The norms and processes of international law come into play when different international 
actors interact, and may come into play even when a state’s internal actions, directed at its own citizens, 
offend generally accepted international legal rules and values.3
 
International lawyers, as well as international law broadly conceived, may have much to contribute to a 
project such as New Land for Peace.  First, lawyers, particularly Western lawyers, typically are trained to 
have a rather critical perspective about the world. That is, lawyers are good at spotting “obstacles” or 
problems that could stand in the way of the effective achievement of an objective. International lawyers 
will raise questions about whether a proposed project is consistent with generally accepted rules, values, 
and processes. In the field of public international law, these accepted rules, values, and processes derive  
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principally from treaties and customary international law, a source of law depending in large measure on 
consistent state practice. Many well-established “background” rules concern limits on the permissible 
activities of states. Deviation from or failure to take account of these rules could contribute to adverse 
reactions from other states and other international actors, in a variety of fora. 
 
International lawyers may contribute to a New Land for Peace project in a second way, in addition to 
their role in recognizing potential obstacles to actions. International lawyers may help by envisioning 
different possible ways to structure relationships in light of the risks and benefits associated with 
different forms of relationships. Law does not typically command that relationships must be structured in 
only one fashion, and lawyers’ past exposure to numerous different relationship structures may help 
them to generate ideas about how to specify rights, obligations, and dispute settlement procedures for 
parties – private parties, states, and other entities – engaged in economic and political activities. 
International lawyers must be familiar with cross-cultural contexts that shape how formal relationships 
are understood and what risks attend different forms of relationships.4  
 
With respect to a New Land for Peace project, legal problems would likely take a back seat to diplomatic 
problems.  If all participants and interested observers conclude that a New Land for Peace project can 
contribute to an easing of tensions in the Middle East, any legal concerns may well seem minor.  But if 
some important actors do not accept the desirability of the idea or structure of this project, legal concerns 
could be magnified, and could become focal points for challenges to the project. 
 
II. International Law:  Substantive Issues 
 
The international law issues related to the proposed New Land for Peace project concern two broad areas.  
These are, first, construction of the proposed land reclamation works, artificial island, and deepwater 
port; and, second, the operation of the port and the conduct of other activities on the artificial island. 
 
A.  Project Construction Issues 
Building structures in the oceans presents questions about international law of the sea and international 
environmental law.  One major source of the law of the sea is the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea,5 which entered into force in 1994.  Egypt and 144 other states are parties to it,6 and even 
nonparties regard most portions of the Convention as reflecting customary international law.7
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Under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and customary international law, the rights and 
responsibilities of coastal states and other actors are linked to various maritime zones in which activities  
occur.  One important zone is the territorial sea, which extends up to 12 nautical miles from a coastal 
state’s baselines (generally, its coastline).8  Both Israel and Egypt have claimed a 12-mile territorial sea.9  
The artificial island envisioned in one preliminary New Land for Peace plan, to be constructed 8-10 
kilometers offshore and connected to the shore by a causeway,10 would fall within the territorial sea. 
 
It is, as a threshold matter, essential to determine in whose territorial sea an artificial island would be 
located.  Because a coastal state has “sovereignty” in its territorial sea,11 the decision to allow or approve 
construction of an artificial island in the territorial sea would belong to the coastal state.  One proposed 
artificial island is described as being located “just north of the border” between Egypt’s Sinai region and 
the Gaza Strip.12  Would this artificial island certainly be located in Egyptian waters?  Although an 
artificial island and causeway might be located in an area that observers would agree is “clearly” within 
Egyptian waters, it is important to note that no treaties or international arbitral or judicial decisions 
delimit the maritime boundary between Egypt and Gaza.13
 
If an artificial island were planned in the waters off the Gaza Strip, as some proposals envision,14 
uncertainty concerning the legal status of Gaza could lead to legal and political complications. To say that 
the legal status of, or sovereignty in, the Gaza Strip is uncertain is an understatement. Egypt has not 
claimed full sovereignty over Gaza; Israel operates as an occupying or administering power in Gaza 
rather than as a traditional sovereign power; and the Palestinian peoples there arguably have only limited 
autonomy.15  Who would be authorized to approve construction of an artificial island in the waters off the 
Gaza Strip, and who would be responsible for the exercise of jurisdiction on the island with respect to 
criminal or security matters? The answers to those questions are politically sensitive and legally 
debatable.  
 
Even if the issue of who has sovereignty over the relevant section of territorial sea is clarified, 
international law issues relating to the construction of an artificial island in the territorial sea remain. A 
coastal state’s sovereignty over its territorial sea is conditioned by the right of vessels of other states to 
engage in innocent passage.16 Innocent passage refers to the passage of foreign vessels in ways that do not 
prejudice “the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.”17 Would construction of an artificial 
island, particularly if it is built with a connecting causeway rather than a bridge, unreasonably interfere 
with innocent passage?  Coastal states may, in the interest of safety, designate sea lanes allowing for  
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innocent passage in the territorial sea,18 so the responsible coastal state presumably could arrange for sea 
lanes to the seaward side of an artificial islands.  But coastal state requirements must not “have the  
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage,”19 and the designation of sea lanes 
must “take into account the recommendations of” the International Maritime Organization.20
 
Would construction of an artificial island affect the location of the territorial sea?  If an artificial island 
were built 8-10 kilometers offshore, as suggested in one New Land for Peace proposal,21 would the 
baseline from which the territorial sea and other maritime zones are measured be extended 8-10 
kilometers farther out into the Mediterranean, potentially adversely affecting the navigation, fishing, and 
overflight rights of other states in this area?  The general answer is “no,” according to Article 11 of the 
Law of the Sea Convention: 
 
For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which 
form an integral part of the harbour system are regarded as forming part of the coast.  Off-shore 
installations and artificial islands shall not be considered as permanent harbour works. 
 
But might a causeway to an artificial island, or a portion of that causeway, if it helps to shelter a coastal 
port, be considered part of “permanent harbour works,” which would count as coast for purposes of 
determining the baseline?22  Or if a causeway resulted in sedimentation that rose above sea level over the 
years, would that new sedimentation be regarded as part of the coast?  Although construction of an 
artificial island most likely would not affect coastal baselines, given Article 11, questions could arise 
concerning the effects on baselines of a causeway that also served a port-protective function, or of new 
land created by sedimentation.23
 
The construction of an artificial island or a land reclamation project would also raise international 
environmental law issues.  This subject is addressed in numerous treaties, other instruments, and 
international court and arbitral decisions.  Late in 2003, for example, the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea addressed claims by Malaysia that a Singapore land reclamation project would adversely 
affect the marine environment by, among other things, increasing sedimentation, increasing coastal 
erosion, and increasing salinity and pollution due to discharges.24  The Tribunal focused on a variety of 
procedural obligations, found in the Law of the Sea Convention and in general international law, which 
require steps of assessment, notification, and cooperation.  For example, potential effects of activities 
reasonably believed to cause significant and harmful changes to the marine environment must be 
assessed,25 and other states must be notified about damage to the environment.26  The Tribunal in the 
Malaysia-Singapore Land Reclamation Case also invoked what it termed the “fundamental” duty to  
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address environmental concerns through cooperation.27  In addition, the Tribunal found that, “given the 
possible implications of land reclamation on the marine environment, prudence and caution require[d]” 
the establishment of certain risk-assessment mechanisms.28  The Tribunal’s “prudence and caution”  
language indirectly echoed the still-evolving “precautionary principle.”  This principle has been 
articulated in treaty law and discussed in the international legal literature with increasing frequency since 
its inclusion in the Rio Principles, which were developed at the 1994 U.N. Conference on Environment  
and Development (UNCED).  Broadly speaking, this principle provides that “[w]here there are threats of 
serious . . . damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”29  Among other broad principles of current 
significance in the field of international environmental law, the concept of “sustainable development,” 
articulated at UNCED, provides a procedural touchstone against which development proposals will be 
considered.30  An artificial island would have effects on the marine environment, effects that would be 
evaluated in light of these established and asserted principles of international environmental law. 
 
Egypt, Israel, and other states around the Mediterranean are parties to the 1976 Barcelona Convention, a 
multilateral standard-setting convention with a specific regional focus.31  This Convention is a part of the 
U.N. Environment Programme’s Regional Seas Program.32  Formal legal protocols related to the 
Barcelona Convention, not all of which have yet entered into force, address such matters as land-based 
pollution, specially protected marine areas, disposal of hazardous wastes, and pollution related to 
offshore activities on the continental shelf.33  At least as significant as these formal legal commitments are 
a range of programs, recommendations, and proposals, under the broad heading of the “Mediterranean 
Action Plan,” which shape expectations concerning pollution, management of coastal areas, and the 
integration of environment and development.34  Through the Mediterranean Action Plan and a related 
Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development, government officials, environmental experts, 
representatives of various intergovernmental organizations, and representatives of nongovernmental 
organizations all meet to shape policy on economic development and environmental matters.  Is a major 
development project, such as New Land for Peace, compatible with the policies of the Mediterranean 
Action Plan?  The issue would certainly be discussed in a variety of regional legal and policy settings. 
 
B.  Project Operation Issues  
A wide array of international law issues would come into play with respect to the operation of an 
artificial island.  This brief section merely notes a few of them, by way of illustration.  First, there are  
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obligations relating to environmental matters, such as the disposal of wastes or dumping at sea of 
materials used on the island.35
 
Second, a range of international trade law issues could arise.  Economic activities on the island might be 
linked to a regional free trade agreement.  Extensive World Trade Organization guidelines and  
notification procedures promote the GATT-compatibility of free trade agreements.36  Bilateral agreements 
may allow goods manufactured in the Middle East to qualify for tariff reductions.37  Trade matters are  
also addressed through bilateral Association Agreements between the European Union and non-EU 
Mediterranean states (under the umbrella of the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership).38
 
Third, how an artificial island’s deepwater port facilities treated matters of vessel safety and vessel and 
port security would likely relate directly to international law.  For example, the International Maritime 
Organization has recently adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code,39 which 
contains a variety of port security and ship security measures.  These are made mandatory through their 
inclusion in amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention,40 to which Egypt, Israel, and almost 
all other countries are parties; the amendments took effect in July 2004.  Detailed provisions of the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention and other marine pollution treaties specify the rights and responsibilities of 
port states with respect to substandard shipping.41
 
What entity would be charged with operating a New Land for Peace artificial island, and how would the 
choice of administrative structure affect responsibility for complying with international legal obligations?  
The next section of this essay notes various options for administering an offshore artificial island.  
 
III.  Structuring a New Land for Peace Administering Entity 
 
What might be the operating structure of an entity charged with building an artificial island or 
administering operations on it?  The central consideration here is not so much legal as it is political or 
diplomatic:  what sort of entity would have credibility or legitimacy in dealing with a project that has 
implications for sensitive issues in the Middle East?  Nevertheless, the history of international law at least 
provides examples of possible models and may suggest some questions about the current viability of 
such models. 
 
One possible model is a traditional, straightforward one:  territory being administered by a unitary state.  
If an artificial island were to be constructed in Egyptian territorial waters, for example, that island could  
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be directly administered by the government of Egypt, consistently with Egypt’s obligations under 
international law and Egypt’s internal constitutional law. 
 
Second, one state could create, pursuant to its national law, a governmental or quasi-governmental 
agency with authority to administer an artificial island, or its port and economic activities.  This  
alternative is conceptually a small step from direct state administration of the artificial island.  An 
example would be the Panama Canal Authority, created under national law, which has extensive  
authority with respect to the Canal.  Article 4 of Panama’s Organic Law establishing the Panama Canal 
Authority provides:  
 
The Authority shall have the exclusive charge of the operation, administration, management, 
preservation, maintenance, improvement, and modernization of the Canal, as well as its activities 
and related services, . . . so that the Canal may operate in a safe, uninterrupted, efficient, and 
profitable manner.  The Authority may delegate to third parties, either totally or partially, the 
implementation and performance of certain projects, works, or services according to this 
[Organic] Law and the Regulations [established under it].42
 
Third, one could in theory operate an artificial island through a United Nations agency.  The recent U.N. 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), established by the U.N. Security Council, exercised 
full executive and legislative functions in East Timor in preparation for the independence of East Timor.43  
The United Nations has exercised administrative “capacity-building” functions in order to promote a 
transition to independence or self-governance, however, and not with a view to long-term administration 
of a territory.  Long-term U.N. involvement with the operation of a New Land for Peace artificial island 
may be politically unlikely. 
 
Fourth, there are historic examples of entities – neither traditional states nor intergovernmental 
organizations, though operating with links to them – that are sufficiently autonomous to be considered as 
having international personality.44  One example is the Free City of Danzig, which operated after World 
War I.  Despite having various links to the League of Nations and Poland, Danzig exercised significant 
autonomy with respect to many governmental functions.45
 
Fifth, several states operating under an international agreement could jointly exercise  governmental 
powers over an artificial island.  Various examples exist of states agreeing on joint development or joint 
management regimes relating to the economic exploitation of marine resources.46  In such an interstate 
regime, the governments of states could either agree to manage an area jointly themselves, or they could 
delegate some management responsibilities to private entities.  
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Any entity administering an artificial island could invite the participation of various nongovernmental 
organizations, on an informal, consultative basis if not as formal members of the entity.  Many NGOs 
concerned with the environment and economic development participate in Mediterranean Action Plan 
sessions (mentioned in Section II.A above in connection with the Barcelona Convention).47  The 
significance of “transparency” in international decision making has gained increasing attention in  
political and legal circles, as a way to promote the legitimacy of decisions that may quite directly affect 
members of international civil society.48
 
If administration of a New Land for Peace artificial island were to be delegated to a private or quasi-
private body, or if administration were in the hands of a non-state entity with international legal 
personality, some overarching international legal issues must be considered.  First, exactly what would be 
the scope of activities in which this administering entity would be entitled to engage?  Would it 
completely displace a state?  For example, would a state retain jurisdiction in criminal matters?  Even 
when a state delegates significant management responsibilities with respect to a portion of its territory – 
perhaps by establishing a governmental authority – the state may wish to retain most or all of the 
authority for maintaining order and administering its criminal laws there. 
 
Second, who would be responsible – an international law term of art – for environmental damage or other 
harm occurring during the operation of an artificial island?  Suppose Egypt incorporated a company or 
agency with development and management responsibilities for an artificial island.  Egypt would not 
necessarily thereby be able to shield itself from liability for conduct leading to significant environmental 
damage to other states or the international commons.49  Furthermore, a state may also be responsible at 
international law if it fails to act with due diligence to prevent a private entity subject to its jurisdiction 
from causing certain types of damage.50
 
If an intergovernmental organization were to administer the artificial island, difficult questions about the 
international legal responsibility of the organization would arise should damage to a protected interest 
occur.  It is difficult to generalize about the responsibility of intergovernmental organizations and 
available remedies; the analysis of responsibility would vary depending on the particular attributes of the 
international personality of the organization, and on the particular issue involved.  For example, the 
analysis would vary depending on whether the issue concerned the organization’s failure to follow its 
own internal operational procedures; or whether the organization contributed to some tortious injury, 
perhaps to someone working for it; or whether acts or omissions of the organization breached some 
substantive rule of international law.51
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Significant flexibility exists with respect to how the governing authority of an artificial island could be 
structured.  The choice among different governing options will likely be politically sensitive.  
International lawyers can evaluate the benefits and detriments of different governing options, and can 
point out the significance of background rules concerning state responsibility and responsibility of 
international organizations for operations conducted under different possible options.  
 
IV. International Law: Process 
 
One cannot understand international law rules without understanding the context in which they operate.  
Part of that context is procedural.  In what settings would international law rules – for example, law of 
the sea rules concerning the implications of an artificial island for noncoastal state rights – be raised?  
And for what purposes would some procedural option be invoked?  Would it be invoked in order to try 
to make sure that a New Land for Peace proposal can be integrated with preexisting international law 
rules or processes, or to clarify applicable legal requirements?  To “force” some modification of plans, or 
some delay?  As a public forum to complain about some controversial policy or to mobilize public 
opinion against some aspect of the proposal?  
 
A range of different fora might consider international law issues.  Many public international law concerns 
are raised quietly, and are dealt with via diplomatic negotiations.  But complex multilateral legal regimes, 
especially environmental regimes, also often provide an array of settings, some quite formal and some 
informal, in which standards and goals are set.  For example, the Mediterranean Action Plan, noted in 
Section II.A above, involves commissions and meetings that might well address “sustainable 
development” aspects of the New Land for Peace proposal. 
 
Formal third-party dispute settlement procedures, especially those linked to treaties, have increased in 
number and prominence in recent decades.  For example, by becoming a party to the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, Egypt subjected itself to the Convention’s dispute settlement provisions,52 which may 
involve the obligatory submission of disputes to formal, binding third-party procedures.  In most cases, 
the third-party forum will be an arbitral tribunal.53  But the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 
an institution created by this Law of the Sea Convention,54 would have residual compulsory jurisdiction 
to address requests for provisional measures.  Article 290 of the Law of the Sea Convention authorizes the 
Tribunal to prescribe “appropriate” provisional measures, necessary either “to preserve the respective 
rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment,”55 pending a  
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third-party procedure addressing the full merits of the case.  The Malaysia-Singapore Land Reclamation 
Case, discussed in Section II.A above, was a provisional measures case.56
 
The most prominent third-party forum is the International Court of Justice.  Even if the requisite mutual 
consent necessary to bring a contentious interstate case to the I.C.J. is lacking,57 it is at least conceivable 
that legal issues could be presented to the I.C.J. via a request from the U.N. General Assembly for an 
advisory opinion.58  The recent case concerning the legality of Israeli barriers in the occupied West Bank59 
illustrates the potential for using the I.C.J. as a public forum to publicize or criticize controversial state  
actions.  The possibility of an I.C.J. advisory opinion concerning legal aspects of the New Land for Peace 
initiative seems remote.  Yet the potential use of various third-party dispute settlement mechanisms as 
public fora to complain about particular actions highlights the importance of diplomacy and the 
importance of seeking consensus among all interested groups concerning the design, construction, and 
operation of a New Land for Peace project. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Many disciplines can help to envision and plan for the possibility of a New Land for Peace project.  
International law’s rules, values, and processes form part of the background landscape for any such 
project.  International lawyers can contribute their understanding of these rules, values, and processes, as 
well as their skills in planning transactions and assessing risks. 
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